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J PThe PulseNet surveillance system is a molecular subtyping network of public health and food
regulatory agency laboratories designed to identify and facilitate investigation of foodborne illness
outbreaks. This study estimates health and economic impacts associated with PulseNet. The
staggered adoption of PulseNet across the states offers a natural experiment to evaluate its
effectiveness, which is measured as reduction of reported illnesses due to improved information,
enhanced industry accountability, and more-rapid recalls. Economic impacts attributable to
PulseNet include medical costs and productivity losses averted due to reduced illness. Program
costs are also reported. Better information and accountability from enhanced surveillance is
associated with large reductions of reported illnesses. Data collected between 1994 and 2009 were
assembled and analyzed between 2010 and 2015. Conservatively, accounting for underreporting and
underdiagnosis, 266,522 illnesses from Salmonella, 9,489 illnesses from Escherichia coli (E. coli), and
56 illnesses due to Listeria monocytogenes are avoided annually. This reduces medical and
productivity costs by $507 million. Additionally, direct effects from improved recalls reduce illnesses
from E. coli by 2,819 and Salmonella by 16,994, leading to $37 million in costs averted. Annual costs
to public health agencies are $7.3 million. The PulseNet system makes possible the identiﬁcation of
food safety risks by detecting widespread or non-focal outbreaks. This gives stakeholders information
for informed decision making and provides a powerful incentive for industry. Furthermore, PulseNet
enhances the focus of regulatory agencies and limits the impact of outbreaks. The health and
economic beneﬁts from PulseNet and the foodborne disease surveillance system are substantial.
(Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73) & 2016 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. All rights reserved.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).IntroductionFoodborne illness continues to be an importantsource of morbidity and mortality in the U.S.Annually, approximately 48 million illnesses
resulting in 128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths
are caused by contaminated food.1,2 In response to this
problem, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) created PulseNet: a molecular subtyping network
of federal, state, and local public health laboratories
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The development of a national database of molecular
“ﬁngerprints” for clinical isolates of foodborne pathogens
utilizing uniform standards and protocols has allowed for
seemingly sporadic cases of foodborne illness to be linked
to previously unidentiﬁable outbreaks. The speciﬁc objec-
tives of PulseNet are to detect foodborne disease case
clusters through comparison of pulsed ﬁeld gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE) patterns; to allow for real-time commu-
nication between federal, state, and local health
departments; to facilitate early identiﬁcation of common
source outbreaks; and to help food regulatory agencies
identify areas where implementation of new measures is
likely to improve the safety of the food supply.3
The goals of this study were to estimate illness reduction
attributable to PulseNet and assess the costs and beneﬁts
associated with the PulseNet program. The study focuses
on program effectiveness for Salmonella, shiga toxin–
producing Escherichia coli (STEC) and Listeria monocyto-
genes— a subset of important pathogens that have been a
part of PulseNet for an amount of time sufﬁcient to allowournal of Preventive Medicine. All rights reserved. This is an open
-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Scharff et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73 S67for empirical analysis. Results from this analysis will help
public health ofﬁcials, policymakers, and the public assess
the health and economic returns from maintaining, and
potentially even expanding, the PulseNet program.
Methods
Two approaches were used to assess the number of illnesses
averted due to PulseNet. First, a “Recall” model was developed to
assess the direct effects of faster identiﬁcation of outbreaks on
consumption of contaminated product and the resultant illness
reduction. Second, a “Process Change” model was designed to
capture the indirect effects from enhanced outbreak identiﬁcation
on illnesses averted due to new incentives and information used
by industry and government. A comprehensive Monte Carlo
analysis using @Risk, version 5.7.1, was performed to account for
uncertainty in both the illness and economic models. Credible
intervals are reported for terminal values across alternative
models. A conservative cost of illness analysis is then used to
produce summary measures for burden of illness averted. Data for
this study were assembled and analyzed between 2010 and 2015.
An enhanced description of the methodology is available in the
Appendix (available online).The Recall Model
The primary direct effect from PulseNet is earlier identiﬁcation and
recall of contaminated foods, leading to a reduced number of illnesses
associated with the contaminated product. Speciﬁcally, contaminated
food products in interstate commerce may cause illnesses across
multiple states. Aggregation of cases by PulseNet reduces the time
until the outbreak is recognized and increases the likelihood of
preventing additional exposures. To measure this, two Monte Carlo
(probabilistic) models were built to estimate the number of cases
prevented through recalling contaminated ground beef products
associated with E. coli O157:H7 and multistate Salmonella outbreaks
detected by the PulseNet system for the period 2007–2008, which
were the most current years with data available at the start of the
project. Separate models were developed for E. coli O157:H7 and
Salmonella outbreaks owing to differences in the data available from
which to build the models. The E. coliO157 model speciﬁcally looked
at ground beef because it was implicated in 19 of 29 (66%) E. coli
O157 outbreaks with a conﬁrmed food vehicle and because the
second most common vehicle was leafy greens (eight outbreaks),
which are not typically identiﬁed early enough to prevent cases by
recalls.4
For the ﬁrst model, U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety
and Inspection Service recall records were reviewed to identify
recalls related to E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks in which ground beef
products were implicated as a vehicle.5,6 For each recall, the
number of pounds of consumed ground beef was calculated by
subtracting the amount of product recovered from the amount of
recalled product, reduced by 32% to account for product loss at the
consumer level.7 The number of outbreak-associated cases was
determined by reviewing published outbreak summaries, the CDC
Foodborne Outbreak Response and Surveillance database, and the
PulseNet database to identify isolates with PFGE patterns match-
ing the outbreak strain. This allowed for the determination of the
number of cases that were reported, conﬁrmed, and subtyped by PFGEMay 2016for each outbreak. The rate of E. coli O157:H7 outbreak–associated
cases per 1,000 pounds of product consumed was calculated, and this
rate was multiplied by the amount of product recovered to determine
the number of E. coli O157:H7 cases averted in each outbreak.
Although each outbreak-speciﬁc attack rate was treated as a constant
over the course of the outbreak, because the value is derived from
outbreak-speciﬁc parameters, it functionally averages variability in
attack rate differences that would have occurred over the course of the
outbreak. Beta distributions were ﬁt to each of the input variables for
which uncertainty existed: pounds of distributed product, pounds of
recovered product, fraction of consumed product, and the number of
reported outbreak cases. Ninety percent ranges for the number of cases
averted per outbreak were determined byMonte Carlo simulation with
10,000 iterations per outbreak using @Risk, version 5.7.1.
In contrast to Food Safety and Inspection Service recalls, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration does not routinely collect or
report information that would allow an estimation of the amount of
distributed or consumed product. Therefore, the number of Salmo-
nella cases was calculated by modeling the difference between
observed and expected cases reported following initiation of the
product recall. The analysis of U.S. Food and Drug Administration–
recorded recalls was limited to those in which the recalled food item
was identiﬁed as a result of an outbreak investigation.
To estimate the number of cases expected to occur, the number
of reported cases was counted during each week of the outbreak.
The duration of the outbreak was determined on the basis of the
number of weeks between onset of the ﬁrst and last outbreak-
associated cases. Outbreak-speciﬁc negative binomial distribution
parameters were used to generate an expected range of cases per
week for the remainder of the outbreak period, with
the ranges bounded by zero and the highest weekly count of
reported cases.1 Salmonella cases averted in each outbreak were
calculated as
P
(expected cases, week i – reported cases, week i)
for all weeks from initiation of the recall to the end of the outbreak.
Ninety percent ranges for the number of cases averted in each
outbreak were determined by Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000
iterations per outbreak using @Risk, version 5.7.1.The Process Change Model
The process change model was developed to capture indirect
effects of the PulseNet system on incidence of illness. Speciﬁcally,
better identiﬁcation of the source of outbreaks provides informa-
tion to regulators and industry, while creating an enhanced
incentive for industry members to implement practices that reduce
the risks associated with their foods. The fact that PulseNet was
adopted by states to different degrees in different years creates
ideal conditions for evaluating PulseNet as a natural experiment.
The result of this process change is expected to be fewer foodborne
illnesses experienced and reported.
The following three speciﬁcations were used to test the effect of
PulseNet on reported illnesses:
Illnessesist¼β1Pulseistþβ2Isoistþβ3Isoist1þδXstþεi
Illnessesist¼αistþβ1Pulseistþβ2Isoistþβ3Isoist1þδXstþεist
ProbðIllnesses¼ IllnessesistÞ
¼ exp λistð Þ λistð Þ
illnessesist
illnessesist!
; y¼1; 2; :::;
where log λist¼β1Pulseistþβ2Isoistþβ3Isoist1þδXstþεi ð1Þ
Scharff et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73S68In equation 1, Illnessesist ¼ number of illnesses recorded by
National Notiﬁable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) by
pathogen i in state s at time t, Isoist ¼ number of isolates tested
in the state lab at time t, Isoist-1 ¼ number of isolates tested in
the state lab at time t – 1, Pulseist ¼ PulseNet implemented for
pathogen i in state s at time t  population, and Xst ¼ a set of
potentially confounding variables (Table 1).
Reported illnesses are a function of the existence of PulseNet,
the number of tested isolates, both past and present, and a set of
variables which may impact adoption and effectiveness of changes
in food handling and production.8,9 In the ﬁrst equation, no
intercept is speciﬁed because it was assumed that the pre-PulseNet
number of illnesses in a state was essentially independent ofTable 1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample Used
Variable Description
Illnesses Reported to NNDSS
Salmonella illnesses Salmonella illnesses at time t i
E. coli illnessesa E. coli O157 illnesses at time t
Listeria illnesessb Listeria illnesses at time t in st
Tests Reported by Labs
Salmonella isolates Salmonella isolates at time t in
STEC isolatesa STEC isolates at time t in state
Listeria isolatesb Listeria isolates at time t in sta
State Participation in PulseNet
0–1 dummy variable equals 1
if state has implemented Pulse
Controls
State Population Population at time t in state s
Year (t) (Calendar year – 1993)
PCI State per capita personal incom
Regions
New England (0–1 dummy variabl
Middle Atlantic (0–1 dummy variabl
East North Central (0–1 dummy variabl
West North Central (0–1 dummy variabl
South Atlantic (0–1 dummy variabl
East South Central (0–1 dummy variabl
West South Central (0–1 dummy variabl
Mountain (0–1 dummy variabl
Paciﬁc (0–1 dummy variabl
Number of Observations ¼ 816
aE. coli O157:H7 estimates based on 561 observations (1994–2005).
bListeriosis estimates based on 501 observations (2000–2009).
STEC, shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli; PCI, per capita income; NNDSpopulation size. The second equation includes an intercept,
allowing for baseline (pre-PulseNet) differences in number of
cases. The third equation is a maximum likelihood Poisson model,
designed for estimating count data models (such as the number of
illnesses in a given state at a given time). An alternative (spillover
effects) speciﬁcation of this model includes a variable, Iso-ist, to
measure the reduction of pathogen i owing to process changes
resulting from identiﬁcation of other pathogens –i. Essentially,
this model asserts that efforts aimed at reducing one pathogen will
also reduce risks from other pathogens. For example, a facility’s
improved sanitation measures in response to a highly publicized
Listeria outbreak will also reduce the risk in that facility from
Salmonella and E. Coli.Mean SD
n state s 869.292 1,034.520
in state s 64.207 75.240
ate s 15.329 21.934
state s 304.538 488.820
s 31.137 55.840
te s 10.445 20.641
Net at time t
0.631 0.483
5,570,499 6,206,105
8.500 4.613
e at time t 36,149 6,331
e) 0.118 0.322
e) 0.059 0.235
e) 0.098 0.298
e) 0.137 0.344
e) 0.157 0.364
e) 0.078 0.269
e) 0.078 0.269
e) 0.157 0.364
e) 0.098 0.298
S, National Notiﬁable Diseases Surveillance System.
www.ajpmonline.org
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(Salmonella, STEC, Listeria, Campylobacter, Shigella, and Yersi-
nia). This study focused, however, on Salmonella, STEC, and
Listeria because these pathogens were the ﬁrst to be adopted by
PulseNet states and, as a result, have a sufﬁcient number of
observations to allow for empirical analysis.
To populate the model, data were collected from a number
of sources for the period 1994–2009. The number of reported
illnesses from each pathogen in each state was obtained from
the NNDSS.10,11 Salmonella data were available for each state
for all years of surveillance (1994–2009). E. coli O157 data for
the years 1994–2005 were used in the analysis. In 2006, E. coli
O157 was replaced in the NNDSS by STEC, which could not be
used because it is a broader category of pathogens. Reports for
illnesses caused by Listeria were available for most states from
2000 to 2009. Isolates tested and reported to PulseNet from
1993 to 2009 for each pathogen were obtained through
personal correspondence (P. Gerner-Smidt, CDC, written com-
munication, 2010). For each of these variables, a “lagged
isolate” variable was created. The number of usable observa-
tions ranged from 501 (for Listeria) to 816 (for Salmonella).
The three models detailed in Equation 1 were estimated using
LIMDEP, version 9.0 econometric software.
National illness reduction was calculated as “PulseNet Imple-
mented”  51 (the marginal effect of PulseNet implementation
for the average state times the number of states in which
PulseNet has been implemented) þ “Lagged Isolates Tested” 
number of illnesses for pathogen i reported in the U.S. in 2009.
For the spillover model, this calculation included the marginal
effects of lagged isolate testing for each of the three pathogens.
For each pathogen, the number of reported illnesses is an
underestimate of the true number of experienced illnesses. Alter-
native beneﬁts estimates that are adjusted to account for under-
reporting and underdiagnosis are provided. A multiplier for
reported cases is taken from Scallan et al. (29.3 for Salmonella,
26.1 for E. coli O157, and 2.1 for Listeria).6
Economic Impacts of PulseNet: Program Costs and
Costs Averted Due to Reduced Foodborne Illnesses
Program costs associated with implementing PulseNet are gen-
erated as a result of laboratory setup, isolate testing, and outbreak
response, borne both by government and industry. Costs averted
due to PulseNet include medical costs and productivity losses
associated with reduced mortality and morbidity from foodborne
illnesses. These direct and indirect costs averted for each illness are
reported in 2010 dollars.12,13 A complete explanation of the
methodology used to estimate these costs is found in the Appendix
(available online).
Results
The Recall Model
The recall model demonstrated that more-rapid outbreak
response led to signiﬁcant reductions in reported ill-
nesses associated with Salmonella and E. Coli O157:H7
outbreaks.
During 2007–2008, 15 recalls of Food Safety and
Inspection Service–regulated ground beef products wereMay 2016initiated owing to foodborne illness outbreaks of E. coli
O157:H7 (Appendix Table A1, available online). The
percentage of recalled meat recovered ranged from 0% to
66%, with a median of 5%. Thus, for most outbreak-
associated recalls, only a small percentage of the recalled
meat was recovered. Other outbreak-associated parame-
ters were similarly skewed toward the low end of
distributions observed across the 15 recalls. The number
of outbreak-associated cases ranged from 0 to 49 with a
median of 11. The estimated rate of illness per 1,000
pounds of consumed meat ranged from 0 to 7.1 with a
median of 0.054. The estimated number of prevented
cases ranged from 0 to 49 with a median of 1.2. For the 15
outbreak-associated recalls, the ﬁnal estimate for the
number of reported prevented cases was 108, with a 90%
credible interval (CI) from 95 to 266 cases (Table 2).
Based on the CDC multiplier for underdiagnosis of 26.1
cases occurring for each reported case, the estimated total
number of prevented cases was 2,819, with a 90% CI from
2,480 to 6,943.1
During 2007–2008, ﬁve major multistate Salmonella
outbreaks of foodborne illness that led to recalls of
food products were investigated. For these outbreaks,
the numbers of prevented cases ranged from 0 to 345,
with an estimated total of 580 and a 90% CI of 128
to 1,127 (Table 2). Based on the CDC multiplier
for underdiagnosis of 29.3 cases occurring for
each reported case, the estimated total number of
prevented cases was 16,994 with a 90% CI from 3,750
to 33,021.1The Process Change Model
The process change empirical model tested the effect of
PulseNet implementation and testing intensity on
reported illnesses, ﬁnding that both implementation
and intensity were negatively related to illness reporting.
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
process change model are illustrated in Table 1. Over the
studied periods, states reported an average of 869
Salmonella illnesses, 64 E. coli O157 illnesses, and 15
Listeria illnesses. Over the respective time periods for
which NNDSS illnesses were recorded, states tested an
average of 305 Salmonella isolates, 31 STEC isolates, and
ten Listeria isolates.
The effect of PulseNet isolate testing on reported
illnesses is illustrated in Table 3. In the upper panel,
the marginal effects from the base model, as speciﬁed in
Equation 1, are presented for each pathogen and each
model type. For Salmonella, there was a strong negative
effect on illnesses from both the existence of PulseNet
and the intensity of testing within each state. For other
pathogens, only intensity of testing is signiﬁcant. The
Table 2. Estimated Numbers of Cases Prevented by Outbreak-Associated Recalls of E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella
Infections, 2007–2008
Agent Vehicle
No.
outbreaks
No. outbreak
cases reporteda
No. reportable
cases preventedb
Cases prevented, 90%
credible intervalc
E. coli O157:H7 Ground beef 15 276 108 95, 266
Salmonella outbreaks
Wandsworth,
Typhimurium
Veggie Booty 1 87 49 32, 67
I 4,[5],12:i:- Pot pies 1 401 72 19, 132
Litchﬁeld Cantaloupe 1 51 0 0
St. Paul Jalapeno and serrano
peppers
1 1,500 345 50, 714
Typhimurium Peanut butter and
peanut-containing
products
1 714 114 27, 214
Total
Salmonella
Multiple 5 2,753 580 128, 1,127
aTotal number of outbreak-associated cases reported.
bReportable cases prevented based on expected number of reported cases minus actual number of reported cases for Salmonella, and the estimated
attack rate of cases per 1,000 pounds consumed times the pounds of product recovered for E. coli O157:H7.
c90% credible intervals based on Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 iterations) with distributions of possible values substituted for speciﬁc values.
Scharff et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73S70intensity variable (lagged isolate testing) measures the
effect of past isolate testing on current illnesses reported.
This was negative and signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations
except the random effects E. coli model and Poisson
Listeria model. Given that more testing leads to better
identiﬁcation and traceback of outbreaks, this is consis-
tent with a reduction in future illness due to enhanced
industry accountability. The models’ predictive power (as
demonstrated by R2 values) was weakest for E. coli, which
makes sense given that the dependent variable measures
E. coli O157 whereas isolates were recorded for the more
general category, STEC.
The lower panel of Table 3 presents the predicted
illness reduction associated with PulseNet for each
pathogen. The inclusion of spillover effects led to larger
declines in Salmonella and E. coli cases, but not in Listeria
cases. The reduction in Salmonella illnesses associated
with PulseNet ranged from 9,096 (90% CI¼8,504, 9,686)
in the Poisson base model to 25,181 (90% CI¼20,747,
29,595) in the ﬁxed effects spillover model. For E. coli,
illness reduction ranged from 310 (90% CI¼ –99, 717) to
2,673 (90% CI¼1,718, 3,627). For Listeria, reported
illnesses declined by 27 (90% CI¼ –38, 92) to 151 (90%
CI¼46, 256).
Adjusted for underdiagnosis and underreporting (in
italics in Table 3), mean estimates of 266,522–737,845
Salmonella illnesses, 8,096–69,755 E. coli illnesses, and
56–316 Listeria illnesses were predicted to be avoided as a
result of PulseNet in 2009.Economic Impacts of PulseNet
The economic impact of PulseNet was calculated as
the product of the expected cost per illness for each
pathogen and the number of averted illnesses, as
estimated above.
The cost per illness was estimated to be $1,792
(90% CI¼$1,461, $2,295) for Salmonella, $2,154 (90%
CI¼$1,464, $3,435) for E. coli O157, and $156,019 (90%
CI¼$81,003, $254,934) for Listeria, based on data from
Scharff14 and Grosse and colleagues.15 The total program
costs and healthcare costs averted from PulseNet are
presented in Table 4. Results from the Poisson model,
which generally yielded the most conservative illness
reduction estimates, are illustrated. Estimates are pre-
sented for both the reported NNDSS number of illnesses
and the number of illnesses adjusted with the under-
diagnosis and underreporting multiplier.
The economic returns from PulseNet were substantial.
For the process change models using reported illnesses,
total median costs averted ranged from $21 to $33
million, depending on the model used. When estimates
were adjusted for underreporting and underdiagnosis
factors, the range became $491–$654 million. The direct
effect of removing tainted product from the market
(because of faster recalls) added $1–$37 million.
The measurable PulseNet costs borne by public
health agencies were approximately $7.3 million. These
costs included $1.3 million for the amortized annual
laboratory setup costs associated with the three PulseNetwww.ajpmonline.org
Table 3. Effect of PulseNet on Reported Foodborne Illnesses: Process Change Model
Independent variablesa
Salmonella E. Coli Listeria
A B C A B C A B C
N 809 809 809 561 561 561 501 501 501
PulseNet implemented –22.647** –37.294** –13.573** –0.199 2.894* 0.008 0.197 0.146 0.013
Isolate tests 0.227** 0.160** 0.053** 0.461** 0.150** 0.057** 0.288** 0.301** 0.102**
Lagged isolate tests –0.292** –0.321** –0.166** –0.068 –0.231** –0.092** –0.118** –0.109** –0. 023
Adjusted R-squared 0.859 0.948 0.966 0.484 0.676 0.809 0.905 0.935 0.798
Predicted reduction in reported illnesses
Base model
Illnesses 15,784** 19,758** 9,096** 310 489* 364** 113** 113* 27
90% CI 11,948, 19,623 15,871, 23,662 8,504, 9,686 –95, 717 48, 939 274, 453 39, 187 31, 195 –38, 92
Adjusted 462,487 578,947 266,522 8,096 12,750 9,489 238 237 56
Hospitalizations 297 372 171 11 17 12 104 103 25
90% CI 140, 516 180, 636 86, 286 –3, 29 1, 39 5, 23 33, 190 26, 197 –34, 88
Deaths 6 7 3 o1 o1 o1 18 18 4
90% CI 0, 16 0, 19 0, 9 0, 1 0, 1 0, 1 0, 55 0, 55 –6, 21
Spillover effects model
Illnesses 21,249** 25,181** 11,291** 2,673** 1,597** 670** 151** 75 73
90% CI 16,863, 25,632 20,747, 29,595 5,628, 16,948 1,718, 3,627 609, 2,589 451, 889 46, 256 –46, 196 –26, 172
Adjusted 622,614 737,845 330,840 69,755 41,684 17,475 316 157 153
Hospitalizations 400 474 212 90 54 23 138 68 67
90% CI 192, 687 231, 805 77, 407 31, 173 13, 114 8, 43 38, 259 –39, 189 –22, 167
Deaths 8 9 4 1 1 o1 24 12 12
90% CI 0, 21 0, 25 0, 12 0, 5 0, 3 0, 1 0, 74 –6, 48 –3, 43
Note: A ¼ Random effects model; B ¼ Fixed effects model; C ¼ Poisson model. Boldface indicates statistical signiﬁcance (*po0.05; **po0.01).
aVariables not reported, are: for the random effects models: population, year, PCI, and eight census division dummy variables; for the ﬁxed effects models (state and year being the ﬁxed effects):
population and PCI; for the Poisson models: population, PCI, 15 year dummy variables, and 50 state dummy variables.
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Table 4. Means and Medians. Economic Impact of PulseNet (in Millions, 2010 U.S.$)
Costs averted,
Program costs for
public health agencies, Net cost averted,
Net cost averted per
public health $ invested,
Mean, Median Mean, Median Mean, Median Mean, Median
Model CI (5%–95%) CI (5%–95%) CI (5%–95%) CI (5%–95%)
Simple lag (Process change model)
Reported 21.3, 20.7
(11–34)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
14.0, 13.5
(3–26)
2.9. 2.9
(1–5)
Adjusteda 506.8, 491.3
(410–646)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
499.5, 484.0
(402–639)
69.7, 67.6
(56–89)
Spillover effects (Process change model)
Reported 33.1, 32.0
(14–55)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
25.8, 24.7
(7–48)
4.6, 4.4
(2–8)
Adjusteda 654.4, 638.5
(340–1,002)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
647.1, 631.2
(333–995)
90.0, 87.7
(47–138)
Recall model
Reported 1.3, 1.2
(0.5–2)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
–6.0, –6.1
(–7– –5)
0.2, 0.2
(0.1–0.3)
Adjusteda 36.5, 35.1
(13–65)
7.3, 7.3
(7.1–7.6)
29.2, 27.8
(6–58)
5.0, 4.8
(2–9)
aAdjusted for underreporting and underdiagnosis, based on estimates from Scallan et al.1
Scharff et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73S72pathogens examined in this study, $4.3 million in
costs for testing samples and investigating clusters, and
$1.65 million for CDC’s internal cost of running the
program.
Annually, averted illnesses attributable to improved
industry processes resulted in $14–$647 million in
median reduced direct and indirect costs, yielding
a societal return of $3–$90 for every $1 invested by
public health agencies. The direct effects from improved
recalls yielded up to $29 million, with a societal return
of up to $5 for every $1 invested by public health
agencies.
Discussion
This evaluation of PulseNet demonstrated signiﬁcant
economic and public health beneﬁts from the system.
These beneﬁts are driven by improvements in outbreak
detection, which provide industry and government with
valuable information, while exposing food producers to
increased threat from litigation and reputation losses.
This ultimately leads to adjustments in processes that
reduce foodborne illness. The measurable costs of the
program, in contrast, are very modest.
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that it does not include all
economic costs. Welfare losses from premature death andreduced quality of life due to illness are not monetized here,
but could be potentially large. Also missing are indirect
costs from PulseNet, including costs to other government
entities, administrative costs of litigation, costs associated
with recalls, and costs of implementing and managing
process changes. The largest of these costs, however—the
industry cost of implementing and managing process
changes—is primarily driven by the expression of con-
sumer preferences in the marketplace (the avoidance of lost
sales owing to outbreaks). As such, this cost essentially
represents actions to correct a market failure, thereby
restricting process changes to be efﬁciency-enhancing.
Another potential limitation is that, for Salmonella, the
predicted illness reduction numbers are high relative to
the baseline number of illnesses and are not apparent in
NNDSS or FoodNet trend data (www.cdc.gov/foodnet/
index.html), which have shown relatively stable inci-
dence rates over the past decade. Nevertheless, Appendix
Figure A1 (available online) makes it clear that the
numbers estimated in this study are plausible. Although
Salmonella cases increased more than 20% in states that
had a low ratio of tests to reported illnesses (bottom ten
adopters), the states that analyzed samples from the
highest proportion of reported illnesses experienced a
reduction in illnesses of almost 10% (top ten adopters).
Thus, PulseNet may well have helped prevent a sub-
stantial national increase in the occurrence of Salmonella
over the past decade.www.ajpmonline.org
Scharff et al / Am J Prev Med 2016;50(5S1):S66–S73 S73Also complicating the analysis is the fact that outbreak
identiﬁcation and the media attention surrounding it
leads to enhanced illness reporting by the public.
Theoretically, this will affect the analysis in two ways.
First, because reported illnesses are used as a dependent
variable in one part of the analysis, enhanced reporting
without a control for media effects introduces omitted
variable bias into the model. Properly controlled,
the process model would likely yield larger reductions
in foodborne illness than it currently predicts.
Second, enhanced reporting will affect the degree to
which illnesses are underreported and underdiagnosed.
As a result, in the adjusted model only, the effects of
PulseNet may be overstated. The net effects of these
biases are unclear, but do not undermine the principal
conclusion.
Conclusions
The PulseNet system exposes food safety risks to the
public, thereby giving consumers, industry, and the
government valuable information that can be used to
reduce foodborne illness. The reduction in healthcare
costs and other economic beneﬁts from the resulting
actions are substantial. Improving public health surveil-
lance for foodborne disease is a prerequisite for improv-
ing food safety in the U.S.
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